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Framework for Assessing the Economic Efficiencies
of Long-Run Network Pricing Models
Furong Li, Senior Member, IEEE, David Tolley, Narayana Prasad Padhy, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Ji Wang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a framework for assessing the
economic efficiency of different long-run network pricing models.
The aim is to provide a quantifiable efficiency measure that will
inform regulators, network operators, and network users when an
alternative pricing model is contemplated. The efficiency measure
is derived from the long-term network development costs that flow
from a dynamic interaction between network pricing and plan-
ning; that is the response of network users to differing charging
models, the consequential network investment, and new financial
incentives that follow reinforcement of the network.
To illustrate the approach, the framework has been used to
assess the relative efficiency of three broad class of distribution
pricing models in a study undertaken for the Great Britain (GB)’s
regulator for gas and electricity markets in England, Wales, and
Scotland—Ofgem. The study contemplated three pricing models
that are used in practice. The efficiency assessment in the Ofgem
study was conducted on a pseudo distribution reference network.
On the assumption that the results from the reference network
could be scaled up to the national level, then the assessment
suggests that by moving from the present DRM model to the more
economic LRIC approach, GB distribution network operators
could save in the region of £200 m over the next 20 years in their
network investment costs.
This paper draws heavily on the project undertaken for Ofgem,
but any views expressed are solely those of the authors.
Index Terms—Distribution network pricing methodologies, dy-
namic interaction, embedded generation, investment cost-related
pricing, long-run incremental cost pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
E LECTRICITY generation and demand in the U.K. are ex-pected to change significantly over the next 20 years. All
but one of the nuclear power stations (7 GW) will retire between
now and 2020, as will many coal and oil fired power stations in
order to meet EU Environmental Directives. Meanwhile the de-
mand for electricity continues to rise at around 1% per annum.
It is estimated that by 2020, some 20-25 GW of new generation
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will be needed to replace closing capacity and meet the increases
in electricity demand [1].
The EU Directive requires 20% of all energy to be from re-
newable sources by 2020. This is expected to translate into a 15%
overall target for the U.K., which in turn implies that up to 35% of
electricity generation will need to be from renewable technolo-
gies by 2020. The U.K. government now favors a renaissance
of nuclear power which would impact the contribution that can
be anticipated from gas, coal, and oil fired power stations [2].
Given these uncertainties, transmission and distribution net-
work companies will find it increasingly difficult to plan their
networks. These uncertainties are not unique to the U.K. but
shared by the majority of the developed countries. If network
companies devise their plans against a set of perceived future
scenarios, the planning could be both complicated and expen-
sive since it would need to be cost-effective across a range of
possibilities. Worse, if the reality turns out to be very different to
all of the projected scenarios, then investment will be stranded.
On the other hand, if network companies simply respond to firm
applications for generating capacity then the long lead times for
network upgrading and expansion could frustrate the connec-
tion of new generation.
The only certainty that network companies have is their ex-
isting networks and their ability to connect new generation or de-
mand at varying locations. Although a network company cannot
insist that generation or demand sites at a specific location, it can
use financial incentives to guide them to locations that require the
least network upgrading and expansion commensurate with the
requirements of the user. These financial incentives can be em-
bodied in the form of charges for use of the network.
Network charges can be framed with differing degrees of
complexity, depending upon how the costs of a network are eval-
uated and then allocated. The costs of a network may be deter-
mined as the historic costs of accommodating existing network
users only, the future costs of accommodating new customers
only, or some composite of both approaches [3]–[18].
Once the cost has been evaluated, then there exists a number
of cost allocation methodologies. The simplest allocation
method is a postage stamp approach that uniformly allocates
network costs regardless of customers’ geographic locations.
The more advanced techniques distinguish the costs of the use
of the network at different locations, reflecting the distance
traveled in supporting a 1 MW, 1 MVAr, or 1 MVA nodal
injection or withdrawal. The costs are expressed in MW-Miles,
MVA-Miles, or MW+MVAr-Miles [19]–[22].
Although it is possible to assess qualitatively how one pricing
model might be more efficient than another, it is important to es-
0885-8950/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE
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tablish the magnitude of benefit that will result by replacing one
pricing model with another over a long time horizon. This will
help inform regulators, network operators, and network users as
to the value of moving to any new pricing arrangement.
Previous approaches to assessing the efficiency of different
pricing models have been limited to qualitative considerations.
The relative merits of different pricing models are ascertained
from comparisons of different pricing principles, the resulting
prices, and stability of the revenue recovery for changes in net-
work power flows and user behaviors [3], [5], [6], [8], [19],
[28], [29]. Very limited research has been undertaken to show
how various pricing models might impact on long-term network
development. Paper [9] acknowledged the dynamic interaction
between network planning and pricing and proposed a pricing
strategy based on the long-term network development cost, but
no account was given of how network users’ responses might
change both the network planning and the consequential pricing.
To date, there has been no development in a common platform
that can quantitatively compare competing methodologies for
pricing network services.
This paper proposes a framework that for the first time evalu-
ates the economic efficiency of network pricing models, quanti-
fying the magnitude of the cost savings that can be achieved over
a fixed time horizon. The approach seeks to assess the response
of new and existing network users to pricing signals provided
by any new pricing regime and the consequential investment in
the network. Network users in this context include both gener-
ation and load. Using the existing pricing methodology as the
benchmark, the efficacy of different pricing methodologies can
be assessed from the investment needed in the network to meet
the requirements of load and generation driven by each pricing
methodology.
To illustrate its effectiveness, the proposed assessment frame-
work has been applied to demonstrate the potential long-term
benefits to distribution businesses in moving to an economic
network pricing model. The assessment is conducted by exam-
ining, which out of a number of competing pricing methodolo-
gies, would be most effective at encouraging the economic de-
velopment of the distribution network, particularly in view of
the prospect of a significant increase in distributed generation.
Efficiency is measured from the overall network development
cost over a time frame of 20 years.
Three pricing models are considered in this study: 1) the
Distribution Reinforcement Model (DRM)—a postage stamp
cost allocation approach for each voltage level [23]; 2) Invest-
ment Related Cost Pricing (ICRP)—based on incremental cost
pricing principle, evaluating the network cost in accommo-
dating additional increment of generation/demand at a study
node. The cost evaluation considers the distance that power
must travel from points of generation to points of consumption
(MW-Miles or MW+MVAr-Miles) [24], [25]; 3) Long-run
Incremental Cost Pricing (LRIC)—like ICRP, based on in-
cremental cost pricing principle. LRIC considers the degree
of circuit utilization in addition to the distance. Utilization
is incorporated by considering how a nodal increment might
impact on the present value of future investment [18]. The
methodology has been adopted by Western Power Distribution
(WPD), which is the distribution network operator for South
Wales and the South West of England, for deriving their EHV
network charges from April 2007.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the detailed steps in developing the proposed assessment
framework and characterizes the differing pricing models con-
sidered in the study. Sections III and IV present the nodal price
evolutions that arise from the assessment framework for the dif-
fering pricing models. Section V gives the total network devel-
opment costs over the study period consequent upon the appli-
cation of the different pricing models. Finally conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. PROPOSED ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The proposed assessment framework is undertaken in four
stages. The first stage is to devise a reference EHV network.
Load and generation are connected such that DC and AC power
flow studies can be conducted. An associated asset register and
revenue target enable the application of the DRM to assess the
charges that might apply under present pricing arrangements if
the reference network were a single distribution system.
The second stage in the assessment framework is to consider
a number of different pricing models that will produce various
possible prices for EHV customers who use the system. The
models considered were:
• DRM with site-specific EHV charges. This model is in-
tended to reflect broadly the most widely found pricing ar-
rangements for heavy loads connected to distribution net-
works.
• DC load flow with Investment Cost Related Pricing
(ICRP). This model utilizes the same approach as that em-
ployed by the system operator for calculating transmission
use of system charges in England, Wales, and Scotland
[24].
• AC load flow with ICRP. This is an AC load flow version
of the ICRP model that more accurately reflects the costs
of using the system, as due account is taken for reactive
power flows in the network [25], [27].
• DC load flow with Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC). The
LRIC model employs the same DC load flow calculation as
for ICRP but the treatment of costs from accommodating
new generation and demand now reflects the utilization of
existing assets [17], [18].
• AC load flow with LRIC. This model employs the same AC
load flows as for ICRP but now within the context of the
LRIC cost model [27]
The DRM model was developed in the early 1980s, designed
to respect the passive nature of the distribution network, i.e.,
power flows from the high voltage part of the network to its
low voltage. DRM has been used by many DNOs across the
deregulated power industry. It was not designed with a mind
for a system with significant embedded generation (EG). As a
result, it has two major drawbacks for the present distribution
system: 1) unable to recognize the potential contribution that
EGs might bring to the system, and 2) unable to guide the lo-
cation of new EGs to the overall benefit of the network oper-
ator and consumers. It is therefore important to consider other
more economic approaches that are able to recognize the costs
and benefits that the addition of generation or demand will have
on the system. In presenting the analysis, the output from the
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DRM model is used as the benchmark against which the ICRP
and LRIC models can be assessed. The LRIC pricing model was
developed to address two major flaws present in the ICRP ap-
proach: 1) ICRP assumes that the existing network is fully uti-
lized for existing customers. Any additional power will thus re-
quire immediate reinforcement of the relevant circuits. There is
therefore no recognition of the degree of network utilization; 2)
ICRP assumes that the circuit components are infinitely divis-
ible and that an additional 1-MW power flow can be met by the
addition of circuit component with a 1-MW rating [18].
The third stage is to devise a customer behavior model that
mimics the response of generation and demand customers to
prices derived from the various pricing models. For generic
classes of customers connected to the HV and LV networks,
price elasticities taken from published studies are used to derive
anticipated changes in demand following a change in price.
However, in the chosen reference network, half of industrial
load is connected at EHV. EHV connected load is assumed to be
more price elastic than other industrial load connected at lower
voltages. The growth in EHV load is taken to manifest itself as
new large customers that site on an economically rational basis
and choose locations that have the lowest connection cost and
use of system charges. It should be emphasized that the study
seeks to explore the economic efficiency of different pricing
models in isolation. Consequently the availability of primary
energy sources, technology costs, the availability of land, and
the practicality of connections and planning permissions are
not considered in this study.
The final stage in the assessment framework is to devise an
investment model that calculates the investment costs necessary
to keep the system secure as a consequence of the patterns of
demand and distributed generation that result from customer re-
action to the various pricing models. The relative costs of de-
veloping the distribution network to accommodate demand and
generation over a 20-year period is taken as the measure of the
effectiveness of the pricing methodology in encouraging effi-
cient investment, and hence the value of changing to a different
pricing arrangement.
A. Generation Response Model
In deciding the location at which new distributed generation
will site on the reference network, an investment model is em-
ployed that reflects the cash flow of each generation project. The
model incorporates the capital cost, operation and maintenance
costs, connection costs, EHV distribution network charges, and
in the case of CHP plant, the anticipated fuel price. Given the un-
certainty of movements in fuel prices over a long time horizon,
the anticipated price is taken to be hedged against future price
changes at the time of connection.
Generators are assumed to site at the network location that
will give the most favorable rate of return as viewed at the time
of connection. It is assumed that there will be sufficient price
support for renewable technologies in any year such that the
requisite volume of generation needed to match government tar-
gets will attain the hurdle rate of return of 15% in the investment
model for the project to be implemented.
For generators, the AC models provide a choice of three oper-
ating power factors depending upon the nodal prices calculated
for the provision of reactive power by the network operator. If
the price of reactive power from the network is cheaper than the
cost of providing local compensation, then the model will as-
sume that it is unnecessary for a wind generator, for example, to
install reactive compensation and instead it is more economical
to absorb reactive power from the network. However, if the price
of reactive is such that local compensation is economic, then the
model will install local compensation and the generator will ei-
ther inject reactive power to the network or operate at a unity
power factor depending upon the requirement of the network.
The investment model is based on an economic rationale of
cost-effectiveness. It should therefore be generally applicable
in other regulatory jurisdictions although these may differ in
their renewable strategies and policies. Policy objectives could
be reflected either in the price of electricity, the price of fuel, or
the incentive provided to renewable generation.
B. Demand Response Model
The change in customer demand consequent upon a change in
price can be established by the application of appropriate price
elasticities. The demand for electricity, as for other commodi-
ties, can be expected to decrease as price rises, and vice versa.
The equation usually employed for expressing price elasticity is
As an assumption for this study, the price elasticity for
each customer grouping is taken as that recommended by the
Australian National Institute of Economic Research (NIESR)
in 2004 [26]. These relate to an economy that is not dissimilar
to that in the U.K. Their advice drew on their 1999 study and
a review of overseas studies. NIESR’s recommended long run
price elasticities for each of the customer sectors were
The price elasticities for residential, commercial, and indus-
trial customers can vary significantly from one country to an-
other, but country specific estimates are often unavailable. In
the absence of better information, the price elasticities used in
this paper could serve as a proxy.
C. Network Investment Model
The investment model devised examines the network re-
inforcement necessary to maintain the required security and
quality standards, as load and generation materializes at dif-
ferent locations in response to the output of each of the pricing
models. The position is considered at five yearly intervals,
assuming that the new pricing regimes were implemented from
2005 and that government renewable generation targets were
met. The study period extends from 2005 to 2025.
The physical consequence of demand growth is expressed in
terms of the voltage at each bus-bar and the thermal loading
of circuits and transformers. The model installs static voltage
compensators (SVCs) to correct any under-voltage situation that
may emerge from the load flow analysis. In the event that the
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Fig. 1. Reference network comprising rural, urban, and industrial areas.
current in circuits and transformers exceeds their thermal rat-
ings, then the model employs the next standard size of overhead
lines, cables, or transformers.
In the case of new distributed generation, the consequence
for voltage at each bus-bar is again considered together with the
thermal loading of circuits and transformers and the impact on
system fault levels. If voltages exceed statutory limits, then the
model again installs SVCs to compensate. If fault levels exceed
the fault current rating of switchgear, then the model replaces
the switchgear with the next higher standard fault-current rating.
In the event that the highest rating of switchgear is already in
use, then the model will install fault-current limiters to make
the network compliant with its design standard.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO THE U.K.’S
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK PRICING REGIME
The framework is applied to demonstrate the differences in
future network investment cost driven by the five pricing models
[27]. Each pricing model would influence the locational growth
of generation and demand in a different way, and this will in
turn shape the network investment required in a different manner
to maintain the security and quality of electricity supplies. The
economic efficiency of each pricing approach can be assessed
by applying the investment model described above to determine
the quantum of capital expenditure required to accommodate
new load and generation under each pricing methodology.
Fig. 1 shows the reference network used in the study. It has
275 MW of connected load and 10 MW of distributed generation
at the start of the study period. The network is based on a prac-
tical system and comprises of three service areas representing
three types of customer: urban, rural, and industrial. The urban
area (GSP1) has circuits that are short in distance but heavily uti-
lized, the rural area (GSP3) has circuits that are long but lightly
loaded, and the industrial area (GSP2) displays average circuit
lengths and loading levels.
A. Pricing Signals for Different Methodologies
The results derived from the pricing models in the first year
of the study period are compared in the diagrams below. Fig. 2
shows the marginal rates derived from each pricing model. The
application of pure economic marginal rates as prices will usu-
ally tend to under or over recover the allowed revenue that is
Fig. 2. Marginal costs derived from each pricing model.
Fig. 3. Marginal costs scaled to produce tariff at each node.
Fig. 4. Nodal price evolution for demand with DRM model.
permitted by the regulatory price control. Rates therefore need
to be scaled up or down to match the allowed revenue. Fig. 3 in-
dicates the effect of the scaling assumption used to create tariff
rates that will produce the revenue recovery. Prices at nodes la-
beled 1–11 are the rates chargeable to load at each node in the
reference network, whereas prices at nodes 12–22 are the gen-
eration rates at the same sequence of demand nodes.
IV. CUSTOMER RESPONSE AND PRICE EVOLUTION
A. Customer Response to the DRM
The manner in which prices are derived in the DRM produces
network charges that are the same at each voltage level for all ge-
ographical locations, shown by Fig. 4. Because network charges
are a relatively small proportion of the overall price, and the
price elasticity is low, the dilution of the network charge by other
components of the overall price makes for an imperceptible re-
sponse from larger customers connected at EHV to a change in
the level of the use of system charge. Annual demand growth is
taken to accord with the underlying trend of 1.6% per annum.
The only significant perturbation to the model is thus caused
by the siting of new large industrial load, which is assumed to
connect at the central bus-bar 6 in Fig. 1, since this is within an
industrial area.
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Fig. 5. Nodal prices evolution for generation with DRM model.
Similarly because the DRM has no pricing signal for location,
shown in Fig. 5, the model assumes that new distributed genera-
tion will situate at a location that is most appropriate for the type
of generation. Thus, the higher wind speeds associated with the
terrain around location 8 in Fig. 1 will make this the obvious lo-
cations for wind generation, while the industrial network at loca-
tion 6 will be the obvious place for CHP generation to connect.
The approach for deriving generator use of system charges
(GDUoS) as an adjunct to the DRM is to base charges on the an-
ticipated cost of the investment required to accommodate the ex-
pected quantum of generation that will connect to the network.
Because the GDUoS charges always contribute to the distrib-
utor’s overall revenue, the revenue recovery required from de-
mand customers decreases slightly towards the end of the period
as the overall target revenue is met.
B. Customer Response to ICRP (DC Power Flow)
Prices derived from the ICRP model reflect the distance that
power must travel to find load. Unlike the output from the DRM,
prices produced by the ICRP-DC model vary between nodes
depending upon the extent of the assets at each node.
At first generation is attracted to the distant nodes 9,10, and 11
because of the high credits created by the ICRP model, charges
for demand at these nodes remain high, thus discouraging load
growth. Instead demand tends to grow fastest at nodes 1 and 2
(urban area) where the distances from the GSP are the least, and
prices the lowest, despite being heavily loaded.
Eventually sufficient generation locates at these distant nodes
to cause power flows to reverse with the generation exporting
from the GSP. At this point, the charges paid by generators be-
come positive and demand is rewarded for offsetting the export.
In turn, this stimulates large EHV connecting industrial load to
site at location 9 in the latter part of the study until the power
flow eventually reverses again.
The effect is dramatically illustrated in Figs. 6 and 7 of price
evolution over the study period. These show that the ICRP
methodology gives rise to a pricing instability at distant nodes
where there is relatively little load connected. More heavily
loaded nodes which have short distances to the GSP display a
more stable pricing signal under the model.
C. Customer Response to ICRP (AC Power Flow)
The ICRP pricing model based on an AC power flow analysis
shows a similar pattern of price development to the DC-based
model until 2010. Generally generation is attracted to nodes 10
and 11, which have substantially negative generation charges.
The analysis assumes that wind generation absorbs reactive
power in the production of active power. Figs. 8 and 9 show
Fig. 6. Nodal price evolution for demand with ICRP model.
Fig. 7. Nodal price evolution for generation with ICRP model.
Fig. 8. ICRP-AC generation real power price evolution.
Fig. 9. ICRP-AC generation reactive power price evolution.
the generation’s real and reactive power pricing change over
the study period, where the reactive power charges change as
customers adopt different operating power factors to minimize
their reactive power cost.
D. Customer Response to LRIC (DC Power Flow)
The LRIC-DC model produced a nodal pattern of prices that
are strikingly different to that produced by the ICRP models,
shown in Figs. 10 and 11. Nodal prices are now driven by both
the distance the load or generation is from the GSP and the uti-
lization of the network assets. As a consequence, demand prices
and generation credits for some of the urban nodes tend to be rel-
atively high, while the lightly loaded parts of the network in the
rural area display relatively low prices. The LRIC models create
a dynamic interaction with network users over the study years
that leads to a more efficiently configured network. Charges at
all nodes converge over the period as demand and generation
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Fig. 10. Nodal price evolution for demand with LRIC model.
Fig. 11. Nodal price evolution for generation with LRIC model.
Fig. 12. Nodal price evolution for LRIC model.
Fig. 13. LRIC generation real power price evolution.
are attracted to locations where they can make optimal use of
the network. In time, equilibrium should be reached between
the cost and utilization of the assets at a node.
Unlike the output from the ICRP models, prices derived for
generation from the LRIC models are not an exact mirror image
of the prices for demand. This is because the cost of advancing
system reinforcement will not be the same as the savings from
delaying investment in the network.
E. Customer Response to LRIC (AC Power Flow)
Prices produced by the LRIC model are generally accentuated
under AC power flows when compared to the operation of the
model in the context of DC power flows, shown by Figs. 12 and
13. This is because the capacity in the system is utilized more
rapidly in order to accommodate the reactive power flows.
TABLE I
PRESENT VALUE OF REFERENCE NETWORK REINFORCEMENT
COST FOR EACH PRICING MODEL UP TO 2025
The growth of distributed generation follows the same pattern
as for the LRIC-DC model. Generation is attracted to the urban
area and in particular nodes 1, 3, and 5 where it can provide
most support for the existing system. There is no connection of
generation to the distant rural nodes during the study period.
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR INVESTMENT COSTS
Table I summarizes the output from the investment model in
terms of the present value of the investment needed over the
study period under each of the pricing models.
When the investment costs of meeting new load and gen-
eration are taken together, the ICRP methodologies generally
outperform the DRM approach in the amount of investment
required to reinforce the network. However, the LRIC pricing
methodologies demonstrate by far the lowest investment cost of
the pricing approaches considered with the LRIC-AC approach
producing the best result.
A. Generation-Related Investment Under Different
Pricing Models
Distributed generation is not a part of the DRM pricing model
and there is no locational signal for the siting of generation
under this approach. The investment model indicates that the
highest system cost for accommodating generation and demand
is associated with this pricing methodology. Under the ICRP
models, generation would tend to concentrate at the most dis-
tant nodes since these present the best credits for generation.
The attractiveness of these nodes in terms of price only ceases
when the quantity of new generation causes the power flow at
the node to reverse. This effect has already been seen at distant
nodes on the GB transmission network where the ICRP pricing
model is employed.
The LRIC models demonstrate a major advantage in that the
pricing incentive causes generation to site where assets are most
heavily loaded. As a consequence, no investment is needed to
accommodate the growth in demand. Effectively the optimal lo-
cation of generation obviates the need to reinforce the system for
demand growth.
Fig. 14 shows the cumulative network investment cost for
new generation under different pricing models. When consid-
ered cumulatively over the study period, the AC power flow
models produced significantly lower investment costs than their
DC counterparts, and the LRIC-AC model marginally outper-
formed the ICRP-AC model. The merit of the AC pricing model
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Fig. 14. Present value in £/MW of network investment cost for new generation
under different pricing models.
Fig. 15. Present value in £/MW of network investment cost for meeting new
load under different pricing models.
variant is that it also reflects the costs of meeting the network re-
quirements for reactive power.
B. Demand-Related Investment Under Different
Pricing Models
The principal investment cost that results from the addition
of new load was the increase in transformer capacity and
circuit reinforcement as a result of thermal limitations and
under-voltages. The LRIC models encourage generation to
locate at the most heavily loaded nodes, thus obviating the need
for system reinforcement at these locations to accommodate
future demand. As noted, the reinforcement cost for demand
under this pricing model was thus zero.
The ICRP models require most investment for the connection
of incremental load. This follows from encouraging load to site
at nodes that have the least distance from the associated GSP
without reference to the utilization of the relevant assets, which
in the reference network are the most heavily loaded circuits and
transformers.
Over the 20-year study period, the DRM methodology re-
quires the greatest amount of cumulative network investment of
any of the pricing models to accommodate new load.
Since reactive power charges are not reflected in the deriva-
tion of the demand response to the pricing signals, the invest-
ment model calculates the same investment cost for both the DC
and AC variants of the ICRP and LRIC models.
Fig. 15 shows the network investment cost associated with ac-
commodating demand under different pricing models. It demon-
strates that in an uncertain commercial environment, network
pricing can play a vitally important role in influencing the fu-
ture pattern of generation and demand, which in turn shapes the
network development. LRIC is shown to have the best potential
to attract generation and demand to places that lead to the least
cost in developing the network.
While it may not be practical for all generation and demand
to locate at places to minimize network development costs be-
cause of the availability of primary fuel sources or planning con-
straints, a significant number of new users will have flexibility in
their choice of location, including energy intensive loads such as
some computer centers and CHP plants. If users do not respond
to the economic message from the network operator, then they
will either have to bear the higher network charges or lose the
potential credits they could otherwise earn.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a new framework for assessing the eco-
nomic efficiency of different network pricing models. The ef-
ficiency measure is derived from the long-term network devel-
opment costs that flow from a dynamic interaction between net-
work pricing and planning; that is the response of network users
to differing pricing models, the consequential network invest-
ment, and new financial incentives that follow reinforcement of
the network.
To illustrate the approach, the proposed framework has been
used to assess the relative efficiency of five different distribu-
tion pricing models in a study undertaken for the regulator of
the gas and electricity markets in Great Britain—Ofgem. First,
the proposed framework has been applied to the DRM, which
is essentially a postage stamp allocation of costs at each voltage
level. This creates a baseline against which to judge the ben-
efits of alternative pricing models based on economic princi-
ples. Four pricing methodologies were assessed. These were the
ICRP model that is based on the distance that power must travel
to serve customers, an AC variant of the ICRP model, and two
new LRIC pricing models developed by the University of Bath
that reflect both the distance and the degree of asset utilization.
The DRM model does not provide any pricing signal for the
location of future generation and demand. As a consequence,
it produced the highest investment cost for developing the
reference network over the study period of 20 years (from
2005–2025). The ICRP pricing model reflects the cost of rein-
forcing circuits of different lengths, and resulted in a slightly
lower cost in accommodating future generation and demand. In
the case of the LRIC model, the cost of network development
to accommodate generation was similar to that of ICRP, but it
incurred no extra cost in meeting future increases in demand.
This resulted in significant cost savings.
The LRIC-AC model showed the greatest reduction in the
present value of the cost of reinforcing the EHV reference net-
work, which served 275 MW of load and 10 MW of generation
in the base year, over a 20-year period. If the saving of £830 k
for the reference network could be extrapolated across the GB
system, it would imply a saving in investment costs over the
20-year study period in the region of £200 million.
Ofgem has relied on this study in urging six of the seven GB
distribution businesses that hold 12 DNO licenses and who con-
tinue to use the DRM for the EHV parts of their networks to
move to a more economic pricing model. It should be noted
that one DNO has implemented the LRIC approach for their
EHV networks from April 2007. On October 1, 2008, Ofgem
published a Decision Document promoting a Common License
Modification that would require all DNOs to adopt the LRIC
principles for their EHV distribution networks on the grounds
that it represented the best available long-run pricing model to
date [31].
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